- A believer is not afraid to tell Netanyahu, stop with expulsions slated in HaUlpana, Migron or any settlement within the rightful boundaries of Eretz Yisroel.
- A believer is not afraid to tell the Ultra Chareidi MK's that the Torah expects Jews to settle the Land, the entire land within the delineated boundaries, to keep the commandments and to protect her! A believer is not afraid!
Mofaz of Kadima joined Netanyahu for the wrong reasons yet may be leaving partly for the right reasons. All Jews even Chareidim and even Jews in the Diaspora must protect the Land of Israel, but religious requirements must be accommodated. It must be a HOLY CAMP! For YOUR SALVATION we wait for. (Liyeshuascha Kivisi Hashem...) and the Jews must be worthy.
From: Paul Eidelberg <paul@i-ari.org>
Date: Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 1:46 AM
Subject: An Urgent Lesson
To: Paul Eidelberg <paul@i-ari.org>
How Some Nationalist Organizations
Helped the Likud win the Election that Led to
the expulsion of Jews from Gaza and the Ascendancy of Hamas:
A Review of the Eidelberg Report on
Israel National Radio, October 18, 2004
The report was entitled "The Next Knesset Elections and Beyond."
******
It's not too early for non-parliamentary nationalist organizations to prepare for the next Knesset election. I just hope they don't commit the disastrous errors certain nationalists committed in the January 2003 election. We're suffering from the consequences. So let me give a post mortem on that election.
Certain opponents of Sharon's Gaza retreat plan may be shocked to learn that they themselves enabled Sharon to foist this plan on Israel! How?
By urging people in the 2003 Knesset election to vote Likud and not "waste" their votes on a small party. These nationalists were still mourning over the June 1992 election, when certain small right-wing parties entered the race and unwittingly prevented the Likud-religious camp from winning enough seats to form the government. These small parties are still blamed for Labor's winning control of the government and imposing Oslo on the State of Israel.
What these nationalists failed to see is that the political situation had dramatically changed last year, in 2003. Labor had been discredited by its Oslo policy of "territory for peace," and the party itself was divided. Polls indicated that Labor would receive only 15 seats, while Likud would win at least 40. Hence the entry of a small nationalist party in the 2003 race could not possibly prevent a Likud victory.
The political situation in 2003 was unique. During the previous three decades, the contest between Labor and Likud was rather close. Many people—especially the religious—voted Likud only to prevent Labor from gaining power. In 2003, however, it was obvious not only that the next government would be formed by the Likud, but by a prime minister committed to a Palestinian state—Ariel Sharon.
What nationalists failed to see is that Sharon's ability to manipulate his cabinet toward a Palestinian state would depend on the margin of the Likud victory.
This margin would determine whether the Likud's coalition partners would support or oppose a Palestinian state, and whether its opponents in Sharon's cabinet would be numerous enough to prevent his pursuing Labor's objective.
Therefore, it was absolutely necessary for the nationalist camp to prevent the Likud from receiving too many mandates. The only way nationalists could do this was to vote for parties to the right of the Likud, namely, National Union, the National Religious Party, and Herut.
Of these three parties, Herut, the smallest, had the most nationalist position—no territorial compromise. The mere fact that Herut leader Michael Kleiner had refused to join Sharon's 2001 national unity government—because Sharon was committed to a Palestinian state—justified voting Herut, more [so] because of Herut's alliance with the [now defunct] Yamin Israel Party, whose nationalist credentials transcend territory.
Unfortunately, certain misguided nationalists, such as the leadership of Professors for a Strong Israel (PSI) and Manhigut Yehudit, misled the public by urging voters not to "waste" their ballots on a small party like Herut. A lot of campaign money was wasted by PSI on ads declaiming against Herut despite my efforts, as Yamin's president, to clarify the nationalist issue. This is not all.
Yamin was aware of the crucial importance of limiting the Likud to roughly 30 seats. Therefore, even before Yamin formed a list with the Herut, I urged Moshe Feiglin to ditch Likud and join—as well as head—the Yamin Israel Party. Instead, Feiglin encouraged people to vote Likud which Manhigut Yehudit had joined… [for nationalist and religious but misguided reasons of its own]!
Now, suppose Likud had won only 30 seats instead of the 38 it actually won, so that [those] 8 additional seats would have gone to parties on the right. Since Likud MKs, for various reasons, would balk at sharing ministries with Labor, Sharon would have had to form a government coalition with National Union and the religious parties.
This would have excluded Shinui, since Shinui had pledged not to sit in a government with religious parties, especially Shas. Without Shinui, Sharon could not possibly ram his Gaza retreat plan through the cabinet; indeed, the plan would have died before it was born.
Had the voters not been turned away from Herut, it would have passed the electoral threshold—it was within a few thousand votes of doing so. Kleiner would now be in the Knesset, and he would be vigorously opposing and arousing public opposition to Sharon—which no one is now doing in any organized way. But those few thousand votes were lost because well-meaning people and organizations campaigned against Herut on the naïve grounds that Herut would "divide the nationalist camp."
This post mortem [my Report of October 18, 2004] continued is not sour grapes. It's a warning about the next Knesset election. Those who are either swelling the ranks of the Likud, like Manhigut Yehudit, or speaking against any small, genuine nationalist party, should think again. [Pause for an unrecorded question regarding Manhigut Yehudit, to which I replied:] "If 50,000 Manhigut people give Likud an extra Knesset seat, it could mean an extra cabinet ministry, but one appointed by Sharon, not Moshe Feiglin."
Although the Likud is likely to lose some seats because of Sharon's adoption of Labor's Gaza retreat policy, he still enjoys more public support than his competitors—the wimps in his cabinet. The public's misplaced confidence in generals remains a decisive factor in Israeli politics. Therefore, it's more important than ever for extra-parliamentary nationalist groups to unite to diminish the number of Likud mandates. They need not fear the ascendancy of a left-wing government. The Left is split and largely discredited.
Summing up: those nationalists who prevented Herut from breaking the electoral threshold in the January 2003 election, or who lured people into the Likud, unwittingly contributed to Sharon's Gaza retreat plan. They should engage in serious self-criticism and develop a more sophisticated understanding of Israel's political system—a system that thwarts the clearly expressed will of the Jewish people.
But now I want to say a few words about the so-called nationalist camp. What is meant by a nationalist? You can't be a nationalist unless you emphasize the nation or the national interest. But how can you [effectively] emphasize the national interest when the nation is fragmented into a welter of parties? At least 20 compete in an election and as many as 15 get into the Knesset. Why does this happen?
There are several reasons. Given Israel's single, nationwide electoral district, parties must compete for Knesset seats on the basis of proportional representation. Since no party has ever won a majority of Knesset seats, the cabinet invariably consists of a multiplicity of party leaders, each with his own personal and partisan interests. And since these party leaders never have to compete in regional or constituency elections, they remain safely ensconced at the top of their party's electoral list, and they can influence the order of candidates on those lists despite party primaries. This makes Knesset Members subservient to their party leaders, especially when their party leaders are cabinet ministers.
Look: the cabinet consists of a loose combination of parties. Their business is not to pursue a national program "but merely to divide positions of influence and the national budget"—to quote Ben-Gurion. But this means that the very system of government is an anti-nationalist or anti-Zionist system!
Therefore, if you are not committed to changing this system, you are not a genuine or intelligent nationalist or Zionist! So, what are called nationalist parties are nothing more than territorial nationalists. And we see [that] Israel's territory is shrinking, and our territorial nationalists are partly responsible for this shrinking because of their ignorance about political institutions—or how the system of government has undermined Israel's hold on its territory!
So, what must you advocate to be a genuine and intelligent nationalist? You must reform all three branches of Israeli government.
First and foremost, the Legislature: its members must be individually elected by and be accountable to the voters. Power must shift from parties to the people. This is being a nationalist.
Second, the Executive: coalition-party cabinet government must be replaced with a Presidential system. This is being a genuine and intelligent nationalist.
Third, we must curtail the power of the anti-nationalist, anti-Zionist Supreme Court—which has usurped powers belonging to the Legislature and the Executive.
Finally, a true and intelligent nationalist understands that we need a Constitution ratified by the nation, a constitution that will delineate the powers of the three branches of government, a Constitution designed to unite both religious and non-religious Jews. I have designed such a Constitution for the Yamin Israel Party.
[Pause for an unrecorded question regarding Feiglin to which I replied]: "The trouble is that Feiglin, to the best of my knowledge, does not say a word about regional elections, which is the key to changing the system. So while he may speak of my book as his bible, he has ignored its key point. He emphasizes Jewish leadership. Fine, I wrote his first serious essay on the subject. But if you want Jewish leadership to be effective, you must shift power from parties to the people, and this requires regional elections. And since the vast majority of the people prefer to vote for a personal representative than for a party slate, he could get a lot more support if he takes this line, as I have urged him to do. If he does this, he can then say that he is moiré democratic than his opponents in the Likud."
Sincerely,
Robin Ticker
Activist emails sent to my list are L'Ilui Nishmat Yisrael ben David Aryeh ob"m (Izzy - Kaplan) a great activist and lover of Eretz Yisroel, Am Yisroel and the Torah. Yehi Zichrono Baruch.
Most of these emails are posted on Shemittahrediscovered.blogspot.com
1 comment:
Prof. Eidelberg's critique is elegant and appealing to many of us, but it's almost EIGHT years old.
What does he say about the situation NOW? What is his plan? What is he doing to bring about a Jewish government?
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